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Involuntary Resettlement in Hydroelectric Projects:  
A Comparison of Chinese and Canadian case studies  
and implications for best practice Abstract  
This paper attempts to compare different political systems with respect to similar 
issues, in this case, the involuntary resettlement induced by the construction of large 
dams. It aims to examine real world cases from both China and Canada, namely the 
Three Georges Dam, and a series of dams being built in James Bay in Quebec 
regarding the involuntary resettlement issue. By looking at the practices of both 
hydroelectric projects in this regard, the role of government in this process and their 
impact on the affected communities and the society as a whole, this paper seeks to 
explore the characteristics of both cases from the perspective of political science in an 
attempt to analyze those practices and the problems that occurred under each system. 
By comparing the differences of both China’s case and Canada’s case, the rationales 
will be presented as to why there are differences or similarities found in quite different 
political and social contexts. Based on previous studies and analysis, several political 
factors stand out as the main contributing factors in shaping the resettlement process in 
China, namely the land ownership system, center-local governmental relationships; 
accountability structures and preference for urban-industrial development over rural-
agricultural development. Aside from that, it’s fascinating to find that even in different 
political systems, some similarities can still be found when dealing with similar issues. In 
this case, due to the nature of the issue and the similar characteristics of targeted 
population, similar effects are found as a result of the involuntary resettlements. At the 
end of the paper, some insights and recommendations will be provided and conclusions 
will be made as to what can be learned from each other in dealing with similar issues in 
the future through a political lens. 
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Literature Review 
 
Resettlement has never failed to gain great attention as well as to provoke 
worldwide debate both in the academic field and in real world practice in the issue of 
development due to its highly controversial nature and the adverse long-term social and 
environmental costs of large development projects (Asthana, 1996; Cernea & 
Guggenheim, 1993; Cernea, 1988, etc.). The nature of development projects is 
economic-driven. The problem resulting from this kind of projects lies in its social impact, 
such as involuntary resettlement. People who are affected by development projects must 
move to places regardless of their willingness. In most cases, they are reluctant or even 
resistant to such relocation. From an ethical perspective, involuntary resettlement is the 
most debatable, or even unacceptable issue involved in launching this kind of project. 
Those who oppose those projects always consider it to be inhumane and against human 
rights. People displaced by dams and reservoirs are considered a consequence of 
development (Cernea, 1990; Scudder & Colson, 1982). Each year, 10 million people 
worldwide are resettled to make way for infrastructure projects such as dams, airports, 
highways1 (Cernea, 1997; World Bank on Dams, 1996). Development projects causing 
resettlement, however, are seen to fit into the nation's ideology and the larger social 
good (Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993).  
Development Projects and Resettlement   
Consequently, there has been a huge pool of academic studies in the field of 
resettlement or relocation as a result of development projects since the 1980s (Asthana, 
1996; Barnett & Webber, 2010; Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993; Croll, 1999; Escobar, 
2003; Feldman, Geisler, & Silberling, 2003; Forsyth, 2003; Hirsch & Warren, 1998;                                                         1 Of these 10 million, large dams account for 4 million displaced people. (Dwivedic, 1999) 
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Oliver-Smith, 2006; Scudder & Colson, 1982, etc.). In particular, resettlement caused by 
the building of dams draws the most attention. Quite a few of them have focused on the 
adverse social and environmental impact relocation has imposed upon the affected 
communities and the society as a whole. Aside from academics, NGOs (World Bank, 
International Finance Corporation, World Mission on Dams, local interest groups, etc.) 
are also playing a big part in contributing to research in this field. The World Bank in 
2004 has already published a guidance book on the planning and implementation of 
involuntary resettlement (World Bank, 2004). The release of the World Commission on 
Dams (WCD) Report (2000) more than a decade ago has also provoked much esteem, 
controversy, and discussion .The WCD Report provided a comprehensive overview of 
the impacts of large dams around the world. It recommended a new approach to 
decision-making based on universally agreed values and strategic priorities (equity, 
sustainability, efficiency, participatory decision-making, and accountability). Besides, it 
also presented a framework for decision-making process which includes seven strategic 
priorities and 26 guidelines for governments, donors, policymakers, planners, and dam 
builders that would involve in the dam building process. This separates relocation from 
other political issues that mainly draws attention within the political domain. Yet, 
development can be voluntary and involuntary. It’s important to distinguish the two. 
Anthropologists use 'push' and 'pull' factors to describe involuntary and voluntary 
migration. Voluntary resettlement refers to attracting people to new places, whereas 
involuntary resettlement means forcing people out of their traditional localities. The 
difference between involuntary and voluntary population movements is that the former 
are caused by  'push' factors only. 'Pull' factors, if any, are the exception rather than the 
rule (Asthana, 1996; Guggenheim & Cernea, 1993). Distinguishing involuntary 
resettlement and voluntary resettlement helps enhancing the understanding of the 
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essence of involuntary resettlement. Besides, depending on geographical context, there 
can be resettlement that is from urban to urban, from rural to rural, and from rural to 
urban. In addition, resettlement can take place in democratic societies and non-
democracies, although a lot of the researchers are looking at resettlement in developing 
countries. All these different forms and circumstances have added dynamics and 
complexities to this issue. This paper attempts to compare different political systems with 
respect to similar issues, in this case, the involuntary resettlement induced by the 
construction of large dams. It aims to examine real world cases from both China and 
Canada, namely the Three Georges Dam, and a series of dams being built in James 
Bay in Quebec regarding the involuntary resettlement issue. By looking at the practices 
of both hydroelectric projects in this regard, the role of government in this process and 
their impact on the affected communities and the society as a whole, this paper seeks to 
explore the characteristics of both cases from the perspective of political science in an 
attempt to analyze those practices and the problems that occurred under each system. 
By comparing the differences of both China’s case and Canada’s case, the rationales 
will be presented as to why there are differences or similarities found in quite different 
political and social contexts. Based on previous studies and analysis, several political 
factors stand out as the main contributing factors in shaping the resettlement process in 
China, namely the land ownership system, center-local governmental relationships; 
accountability structures and preference for urban-industrial development over rural-
agricultural development. Aside from that, it’s fascinating to find that even in different 
political systems, some similarities can still be found when dealing with similar issues. In 
this case, due to the nature of the issue and the similar characteristics of targeted 
population, similar effects are found as a result of the involuntary resettlements. At the 
end of the paper, some insights and recommendations will be provided and conclusions 
will be made as to what can be learned from each other in dealing with similar issues in 
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the future through a political lens. 
Pros and Cons of the construction of large dams  
Having said that, this paper will only focus on involuntary resettlement that takes 
place in different political and social contexts, particularly dam-induced involuntary 
resettlement. Most of the existing literature about hydropower projects, especially large 
ones, has focused on issues around their impacts upon social, cultural and economic 
aspects. The justifications of building dams are usually around its economic benefits the 
affected communities will gain. However, the pros and cons of building development 
projects are both quite obvious. Over the past decades, there has been on-going debate 
around the issues of large-dam construction regarding the nature and magnitude of 
environmental and socioeconomic damage of hydro development. There is both criticism 
as well as support. Advocates, mostly developers and politicians of hydro development 
always argue that hydro power is environmentally positive compared to other sources of 
energy to justify their deeds. They claim that unlike coal, or other natural resources, 
dams don’t produce greenhouse emissions, acid rain, or urban smog, or other waste that 
could harm our offspring, which is renewable and sustainable in the long run. They 
produce way fewer GHG and no other air pollutants, much lower than those generated 
by fossil fuel electricity- “approximately 60 times less than coal-fired power plants and 20 
times less than the least carbon intensive of the thermal generation options” (Canadian 
Hydropower Association Report, 2002; Martin & Hoffman, 2008).  
However, that’s only half the story. Those (mainly NGOs and affected groups, 
environmentalists and anthropologists) who strongly object to the development of 
hydroelectricity argue that actually reservoirs do emit greenhouse gases due to the 
rotting of organic matter, including submerged vegetation and soils and the detritus that 
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flows into the reservoir from upstream (Martin & Hoffman, 2008). Not only does hydro 
electricity cause a different type of global climate change crisis by changing the existing 
ecology but what’s worse, it has put our environment in danger by contaminating water 
and killing trees and animals. Lost forest land and serious harm to the aquatic 
environment (Martin & Hoffman, 2008). According to Martin and Hoffman (2008), hydro 
construction throughout Manitoba has resulted in the flooding of some 600,000 acres. 
Aside from that, advocates fail to recognize the devastating social and 
environmental consequences felt by affected population brought in by hydro projects, as 
addressed by people who are against hydro projects. These projects are ecologically, 
socially and morally catastrophic for affected population and the whole society, one of 
which is involuntary resettlement and its interaction with its social effects.  
For countries lacking electricity and power, hydropower projects are absolutely 
lifesavers. That’s one of the reasons for most developing countries, like China to build 
Three Georges Dam since it generates huge amounts of electricity to relieve the 
pressure caused by shortages. Groundbreaking achievements have also been made in 
related areas like electronics, metallurgy, engineering, and myriad other scientific fields, 
as well as the development of complex organizational and managerial systems, which 
revolutionized the electrical system, required by the generation, transmission and 
distribution of electrical system. As a result, hydro companies made great strides in 
expanding their markets (Martin & Hoffman, 2008). Their incentive for the construction of 
dams is to export their product. In this revolution, there are benefits as well as costs. The 
winners are the consumers of some of the cheapest power. For example, In Canada, the 
case of Manitoba, as the North America, namely the residents of southern Manitoba and 
the American upper Midwest. The losers or the victims have been Manitoba’s Aboriginal 
communities (Martin & Hoffman, 2008). However, to fully assess hydro development, 
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both its economic and social effects should be taken into account. 
Involuntary Resettlement caused by Large Dams  
Large dams have been an important component of infrastructure development in 
both developing and developed countries alike. Consequently, it is estimated that the 
construction of large dams has displaced 40 to 80 million of the world’s people, mostly in 
developing countries like China, India and Brazil (World Commission on Dams, 2000). In 
particular, since 1949, between 18.5 and 20 million people were displaced by 
development projects in India and about 45.1 million in China (Brook, Michael & Duan, 
2008; Fruggle, Smith, Hydrosult, & Agrodev, 2000). The 1980s has been called by some 
as the "decade of displacement" (Asthana, 1996). “Involuntary resettlement—
Resettlement is involuntary when it occurs without the informed consent of the displaced 
persons or if they give their consent without having the power to refuse resettlement.” 
(International Finance Corporation, 2012). It refers to the permanent forced relocation of 
entire households (Croll, 1999; Feldman, Geisler, & Silberling, 2003). Barnett and 
Webber (2010) argue that it’s a special form of migration yet it bears the same 
characteristic that like many migrations, it is both cause and consequence of socially 
engineered environmental change. The involuntary nature of the migration and 
resettlement process involves an almost total loss of control over both choices and 
resources (Oliver-Smith, 1991). Involuntary resettlement consists of two closely related 
yet distinct processes: displacing people and rebuilding their livelihoods (Asthana, 1996), 
which are both significant in minimizing and avoiding the adverse impact the process 
would impose on relocatees. The characteristics of involuntary relocations are (Li, Waley 
& Rees, 2001): they are forced to move against their wills. Since they have no other 
realistic choice but to move; they are usually planned and carried out by governments; 
and they will be leaving their original living places permanently since their home will be 
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inundated. Thus, involuntary resettlement has devastating effects upon affected 
population. At first, one might have a little doubt as to the existence of involuntary 
resettlement in democracies. By this definition, involuntary resettlement can take place 
anywhere regardless of political systems and social contexts. In democratic societies 
most issues are dealt through negotiation. However, due to specific contexts and 
information asymmetry between two sides, some of the negotiation process is somewhat 
symbolic, which can hardly make the process just and fair.  
Existing literature mainly focused on the relocation policies and measures, 
effects of involuntary resettlement and ways to ameliorate the negative consequences of 
forcible relocation (Asthana, 1996; Cernea, 1988, 1997; Cernea & Kanbur, 2002; Croll, 
1999; Oliver-Smith, 1991; Wilmsen, Webber, & Duan, 2011; etc). Cernea (1988) has 
concluded that involuntary resettlement would lead to the impoverishment of affected 
communities. He (1997) also argued that the documented relocation outcomes have 
been overwhelmingly negative. Main Theories on involuntary resettlement include 
Scudder-Colson relocation theory (1982) and “risk model” developed by Cernea (1990), 
which has great influence on the theories and practices in this field. According to 
Scudder and Colson (1982), there are four stages involved in the process of involuntary 
resettlement from the perspective of affected people. It begins with relocation, which 
means the physical replacement. The second stage involves adjustment to new 
environment, during which relocated people suffer from both emotional and economic 
stress of readjustment. A lot of them end up with lower incomes and worse standards of 
living due to replacement. Besides, because most people usually stop making 
investment once they know they have to move somewhere else, by the time of 
relocation, their income and the value of their assets get lower than before. Resettlement 
enters the third stage if economic development and community formation occur, which 
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Scudder notes that most cases do not reach the third stage. The fourth stage 
consolidates.  
Cernea (1990) developed a “risk model”, where he points out that when 
displacement and relocation leave people worse off, the empirical evidence reveals a set 
of eight recurrent characteristics that need to be monitored closely. They all contribute to 
a process of impoverishment. Thus, the "risks to be avoided" in displacement are:(i) 
landlessness;(ii) joblessness; (iii) homelessness; (iv) marginalisation; 
(v)morbidity;(vi)food insecurity;(vii)loss of access to common property assets; and (viii) 
social disarticulation. Those eight aspects together contribute to the impoverishment of 
affected population in general. Both the Scudder-Colson theory and Cernea’s “risk 
model” have demonstrated the negative impact of relocation on the affected population.  
In general, this literature showed that displacement not only resulted in asset and 
job loss but also in the breakdown of social and food security, credit and labor exchange 
networks, social capital and kinship ties. Other effects of involuntary resettlement include 
the social-political disempowerment of the affected people, loss of cultural identity and 
heritage as well as impoverishment (Baviskar, 1995). 
Past Experiences  
Based on past experiences, we know that relocation is just one item of the whole 
package in the resettlement process. Job training, employment and business 
opportunities are also important aspects that should be taken into account to make the 
resettlement process more sustainable for relocatees. Besides, the complexity and 
difficulty of involuntary resettlement results not from the number of people affected 
alone, but from the severity of the consequences to the affected people. Since it requires 
systematic planning and sophisticated political skills to ensure the resettlement process 
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is as harmless as possible, planning is significant in ensuring a successful resettlement. 
Oliver-Smith (1991) addressed the importance of planning in resettlement. He further 
argued that “an ill-considered or hastily drawn up resettlement plan which does not 
attend to such crucial factors as land availability, water resources, soil fertility, plant and 
animal resources, employment opportunities, local housing and settlement patterns, 
inter-ethnic relations, physical security, leadership and local authority institutions among 
other dimensions will be likewise unconvincing”. This statement literally covers all the 
important factors that the policy decision-makers should take into account when planning 
and implementing resettlement policies. It also reflects the complexities of the 
resettlement issue. Public acceptance of key decisions is another essential factor for 
equitable and sustainable water and energy resources development. Acceptance 
emerges from recognising rights, addressing risks, and safeguarding the entitlements of 
all groups of affected people, particularly indigenous and tribal peoples, women, 
peasants and other vulnerable groups (World Commission on Dams, 2000).  This means 
a high level of public participation should be involved in the decision making process. 
Besides, communication and education play a significant role in negotiating with and 
informing the affected population from past experiences (Oliver-Smith, 1991). Even if the 
process is more of an informing one, sufficient information is also necessary and 
facilitates the implementation process. People are most afraid of the unknown, to 
educate them on dams so as to lessen their anxiety and reluctance to hydroelectric 
projects. It would be helpful for the implementation and operation of the projects on 
condition that their voice, perspectives, concerns and expectations to be heard by the 
government. Ideally, one would advocate relocating residents into a permanent 
settlement and more fully integrating them into modernity as well as maintaining their 
traditional lifestyle and culture, creating a win-win situation in which nobody has to 
compromise any part of their interests. But realistically, that’s usually not the case.  
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Dam-induced Involuntary Resettlement in China  
History of Dam building and resettlement issue in China  
China has a long history of construction of hydroelectric projects. The earliest 
recorded dam, known as Dujiangyan, can be dated back as long as two thousand years 
ago. It is located in the southwest part of China and was originally built to fight against 
flood and later as an irrigation system. It is still in use today, serving as an irrigation 
system and a popular tourist spot attracting people from all over the world. Recent 
history saw few hydrostations being constructed until 1949. Since the foundation of 
People’s Republic of China in 1949, dam building in China has accelerated (Wilmsen, 
2011). The period between 1949-1985 is a heyday of dam construction, which saw a 
number of over 70,000 hydrostations and as many as 80,000 reservoirs on behalf of 
hydroelectricity, irrigation and flood control (Jing, 1999; Wilmsen, 2011). During this 
period, dam construction was mainly controlled and financed by the central government. 
Currently, China is the largest producer of hydroelectricity in the world.  It is estimated 
that over 10.2 million people in China have been uprooted as a result dam building (Jing, 
1999). Such large scale of construction caused a dramatic increase in involuntary 
resettlement, the scale of which has been unmatched by any country in the last 50 years 
(World Commission on Dams, 2000). 
Past practices and approaches of Chinese government toward resettlement have 
not been highly praised but rather strongly criticized by both domestic and foreign 
scholars and media. Those activities were considered inhumane and against the 
international norms. Under the Great Leap Forward, the central government dislocated 
more than 1 million people (Jing, 1999). Due to a lack of comprehensive framework of 
resettlement policies and mismanagement, the process of resettlement has been painful 
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and exceptionally hard for both government and the relocatees. Yet the outcomes were 
devastating and controversial. The characteristics of those resettlement program 
launched by governments prior to 1980s were coercion, suppression and neglect (Jing, 
1999). Activist Dai Qing claimed that there are no cases of successful implementation of 
involuntary resettlement in China (Dai, 1994). Woodman states that the practice of 
resettlement in China is more a model of control over information than of good practice 
(Woodman, 2000). Indeed, Stein (1998) “observes that involuntary resettlement in China 
all too frequently implies the abandonment of those displaced to conditions of chronic 
impoverishment”. Chau (1995) estimates that 30 per cent of China’s involuntary 
resettlements have failed. According to previous research, since 1949 displacees in 
China have faced adversities similar to those faced by displacees of other developing 
nations (Wilmsen, 2011). They were considered as the victims of economic development 
and modernization. Needless to say, resettlement programs were mostly considered to 
have failed, or at least considered to be highly controversial during this period. 
However, over the last 50 years there has also been continuous improvement in 
the policies and procedures that address dam-induced displacement and resettlement in 
China. Among those efforts, continued improvement of policy at national level, especially 
compensation standards, is a significant one (World Commission on Dams, 2000). 
Besides recognizing the human and financial costs of substandard resettlement planning 
and practice, the Chinese government has endeavored to improve its approaches with 
respect to the resettlement issue (Nui, 2004). It gradually recognized that resettlements 
could be seen as a chance of developing the affected areas. The concept of 
resettlement with development has fundamentally changed the traditional approach of 
addressing resettlement, which is compensation-based resettlement (Brook, et al, 2008). 
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A Case Study of Involuntary Resettlement of Three Gorges Dam Project 
Introduction of Three Gorges Dam project  
Three Gorges Dam is a reservoir as long as 632 km, situated at Sandouping, 
Yichang, Hubei Province. The construction of the dam began in 1994. It was expected to 
be completed in 2009. The project is composed of the dam, two power plants and 
navigation facilities (Wang, 2002). It’s estimated that some 20 counties or municipal 
districts, 227 townships and 1680 villages have been inundated (Duan & Steil, 2003) as 
well as 23 800 ha of farmland (Chi, 1997). However, according to the government (Jing, 
1999), the project has the capacity of producing 84.7 billion kWh of hydroelectricity 
annually, which helps alleviate the problem of electricity shortage due to increasing 
demand in middle and eastern China. Aside from that, it improves the navigation 
capacity of Yangtze River and the ecological environment by providing clean energy and 
thus reducing the Co2 intensity of GDP at the same time. 
The Three Gorges dam has received great attention ever since. Proposed by 
Sun Yat-sen in 1919, it became one of the most hotly debated political issues within the 
Chinese government due to its unprecedented scale and social and environmental 
impacts. Scholars criticize its profound adverse social and environmental impacts and 
strongly oppose this project. Some claim it’s the demonstration the Chinese government 
has showed to the world what they can achieve. More importantly, they argue that 
institutional desires for political and economic gain have always played a special role in 
the project (Jing, 1999). The political aspect has always been a significant characteristic 
of this project. Prior to its approval by the National People’s Congress in 1992, scholars 
also questioned the feasibility of this mega-project and the management skill of Chinese 
government in handling this kind of issue since past experiences have been painful and 
unsuccessful. As a result, it remains one of the most controversial water conservancy 
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projects ever constructed (Down to Earth, 1994; Human Rights in China, 1998; 
International Rivers Network, 2003). Among all the criticism and controversies, the 
resettlement program is a frequently debated topic.  
Resettlement Program  
The resettlement of the Three Gorges dam project is not an overnight process. 
Instead, it has lasted for nearly two decades and is still in process up to day. The first 
phase of population resettlement started in 1993. Between 1993 and 1995, some 
thousands of people were displaced (Jing, 1999; Wilmsen, et al, 2011). Another 20,000-
plus people were relocated in 1996, and more than 30,000 are being resettled before the 
damming of the river in November (Jing, 1999). As time goes by, more and more people 
were displaced. In 2003, most of the large-scale resettlement began, after the 
completion of the first group of electric generating units. By 2009, 13 cities, 140 towns 
and 1,352 villages will be flooded, and at least 1.2 million people will be relocated (Jing, 
1999). Never before in China, or anywhere else for that matter, has a single 
hydroelectric dam project displaced so many people (Jing, 1999). The majority of the 
displaced people were from small rural communities. Heggelund (2004) claimed that 
more than 87% were classified as rural residents. In other words, most of them are 
peasants who rely heavily or even solely on their lands and communities as a way of 
living. They are considered the vulnerable group in Chinese society. The official data of 
people resettled is 1.13 million (Jing, 1999). But the actual number of population being 
resettled is between 1.3 million to1.6 million. The displacement cost approximately 40% 
of the officially estimated project investment of RMB 180 billion ($28 billion) in 2008 
prices (Wang, 2002; Wilmsen, et al, 2011). The scale of relocation for Three Gorges 
Dam project is unprecedented.  
Findings of current literature overwhelmingly suggest that involuntary 
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resettlement is associated with the impoverishment of the affected population and the 
destruction of the social fabric (Cernea, 1990, 1997, 1998; Scudder, 1997; Scudder, & 
Colson, 1982; etc.). Similar to the impacts of most other resettlement programs, the 
overall adverse impact of the resettlement imposed upon affected population in Three 
Gorges Dam resettlement is that they were considerably poorer afterwards and worse 
off than their neighbours who were not moved (Jing, 1999) since they suffered from 
asset, income and land loss (Brook, et al, 2008; Wilmsen, et al, 2011) as well as 
psychological stress (Xi & Hwang, 2011).  
Political principles, Major Policies and Approaches of Resettlement  
Resettlement for the Three Gorges Dam Project is the most difﬁcult task of all the 
projects involved for Chinese government. Unlike most developing countries, the 
People’s Republic of China established a fairly comprehensive legal framework and a 
variety of regulations to support involuntary resettlement some decades ago and made 
modifications over time (Brook, et al, 2008; World Bank, 2000), from pre-feasibility 
planning, developing the Feasibility Resettlement Program, implementing the plan and 
monitoring the entire process.  
Since the mid-1980s, the Chinese government has carried out a ‘development- 
oriented resettlement’ policy, linking resettlement to development in order to prevent the 
impoverishment that has been typical of past large hydro projects. As Croll (1999) 
pointed out that the with the introduction of "resettlement with development" or 
"development-oriented resettlement," the process of resettlement not only relocates 
people, but also helps them by providing the means of production to generate improved 
incomes. In China, it puts forth the generic objective of resettlement in the slogan 
‘moving out, being stable and becoming wealthy gradually’ (Bryan, Hugo & Tan, 2005). It 
is said to have been designed to guarantee a package of economic benefits to the 
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targeted rural resettlers, including establishment of housing projects, production bases 
and an infrastructure of community facilities (Jing, 1997).  Under this principle, the 
relative policies cover areas of support, including employment and production 
development, funding development, preferential treatment for resettlers, and post-
resettlement activities (Wilmsen, 2011).  The principle is to take resettlement as a 
chance for development and improvement, or at least to restore the pre-relocation living 
standard of resettled people. This policy of “near resettlement” is another approach that 
the Chinese government has taken at the initial stage of the project, meaning to displace 
people to a higher level or further from the reservoir. However, in 1998, the central 
government realized that the deteriorating environment in the upper reaches of the 
Yangtze River was a significant factor causing disastrous floods and that clearing of the 
reservoir areas for displaced people must be restrained (Bryan, et al, 2005). 
Specifically, resettlement planning for each county includes the following main 
elements: ‘planning for rural displaced people; relocation planning of cities and towns; 
inundation treatment and relocation for enterprises; special item reconstruction planning; 
environmental protection planning and cost-estimation. In resettlement planning, the 
relationship between resettlement and economic development has been fully reconciled 
and environmental protection is also given special consideration’ (Wang, 2002). 
Among all the policies, those around compensation are an important aspect in 
the resettlement issue that needs to be addressed since adequate compensation is 
crucial to rural relocated population who rely on agricultural production to make a living. 
The Land Administration Law, first formulated in 1953, outlined the principles and 
procedures for land acquisition (Wilmsen, 2011). It also set the standards for payment of 
compensation for acquired land, which set the foundation for compensation standard for 
resettlement and land acquisition. It has been updated and improved five times with 
additional regulations added to enhance the land law including the Land Acquisition and 
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Resettlement Regulation for the Construction of Large and Medium-Sized Water 
Conservancy Projects (1991 and 2006) (Shi, 2008; Wilmsen, 2011). Under the most 
recent Land Administration Law (2004) (Article 51) (Wilmsen, 2011), when land or 
housing is acquired to make way for a large or medium-sized dam, the standards for 
land compensation and the method of resettlement shall be determined separately by 
the State Council. In this case, the affected population fall under the Land Acquisition 
and Resettlement Regulation for Construction of Large and Medium-sized Water 
Conservancy Projects (Wilmsen, 2011). The regulation was first issued in 1991 and 
modified in 2006. According to the 1991 Regulations, compensation was calculated by 
determining the average annual output value (AAOV) for three years prior to the land 
acquisitioning and multiplying it by a factor of three or four. Land compensation and 
resettlement subsidies are equal to 16 times the average annual output value under the 
2006 regulation (Wilmsen, 2011). Besides, the 2006 Regulations added subsidies for 
relocation and training for livelihoods, annual post-relocation fund support of RMB 600 
per year per capita for 20 years, and community infrastructure rehabilitation and 
improvement based on the needs of resettlers (Asian Development Bank, 2007). 
Other preferential policies have also been formulated by the State Council in 
order to facilitate the resettlement program. The investment needed for resettlement is 
ensured. There are abundant natural resources, such as minerals, hydraulic resources, 
forests, agricultural products and tourist resources in the region offering favourable 
conditions for development (Wang, 2002). 
Other policies include: approving preferential policies such as those given to 
special economic (zones) for the reservoir region’s area and cities; providing low interest 
loans for technical reforms to the relocation enterprises; and resolving that the whole 
country should support the resettlement of (those displaced by) TGP (Wang, 2002). 
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Political Factors that influence the Resettlement Process  
China’s resettlement process has its particular characteristics due to its unique 
political system and historical legacy. The first factor that separates the resettlement 
process from other cases is the land ownership. China has a dual land ownership 
system. In urban areas, land is owned by the state. Urban dwellers can trade their land-
use rights under a leasehold system through selling in the market, subleasing, or 
mortgaging the land (Po, 2008; Deng & Huang, 2004). However, in rural China, land is 
owned collectively, meaning that it’s not owned individually but communally (usually at 
the village level). Rural residents are entitled to use the lands but they are not allowed to 
sell their land in the market (Bryan, et al, 2005; Wilmsen, 2011).  In rural areas, when 
land acquisition occurs, it is a transfer of land ownership from the rural collective to the 
state or under the institutional power of the local government. However, this enables 
local government to expropriate land from peasants at low cost and sell it to developers 
at much higher prices (Ding, 2007; Yang & Wang, 2008). Besides, when households are 
dispossessed of their land, they are compensated not for the value of land but for the 
loss of use value of their land. Therefore, compensation can hardly reflect their price of 
land in its developed use (Wilmsen, et al, 2011; Ding, 2007; Edin, 2003). That’s one of 
the reasons the compensation standards are still considered too low to resettlers (Asian 
Development Bank, 2007) even after 2006, when the updated regulations have taken 
the compensation standards to a historically new level.  
Central-local governmental relations are another factor that influences the 
practice of resettlement. China is a unitary state and its bureaucracy is hierarchical but 
devolved. Laws, decrees, regulations and decisions flow down from the central 
government in Beijing to officials in provinces, prefectures, counties, and townships. But 
local officials are embedded in a local bureaucracy: they have dual responsibilities (and, 
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often, dual funding too)—to their superiors within a ministry as well as to the local 
government in which they are embedded (Wilmsen, et al, 2011). In some sense, 
government is localized because local governments are responsible for the 
implementation of all the policies that come down from the central government. This can 
give local governments a great deal of autonomy if the local economy is successful and 
strong, resulting in loose execution of policies at the local government. Thus, in this 
case, the central regulations can be loosely implemented at local government level as 
well. Under the resettlement policies, resettlement is managed by local governments and 
is supported by the whole nation. The hierarchy of resettlement administration for large 
dam project is illustrated in figure 1 (Wilmsen, 2011). In general, the administration and 
implementation of resettlement policies can be very decentralized. Local government 
can tailor resettlement plans and policies to specific local environment and situations, 
thus having a great deal of autonomy. However, the devolution of power to local 
government is not accompanied by the introduction of systems to monitor and detect the 
implementation of the resettlement policies (Andrews-Speed & Ma, 2008). 
A preference for urban and industrial forms of development over rural and 
agricultural forms of development is another contributing factor that makes the practice 
of China’s resettlement experience unique (Peet & Hartwick, 1999; Wilmsen, et al, 
2011). Since 1978, China’s national objective is economic development while 
maintaining social stability and retaining existing power structures (Edin, 2003). China’s 
modernization is characterized by an absolute preference for urban and industrial 
development. There is huge difference between the rural and urban systems. One 
example is the different citizenship systems. In rural area, people hold rural hukou 
(household registration system), whereas urban residents hold non-rural hukou. People 
holding different kinds of hukou enjoy different levels of social services, such as health 
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and education. For a long time, this system has been a big obstacle for rural residents to 
become better off. 
 
Fig. 1 Hierarchical Structure of Resettlement Administration for Dam Projects 
Rural residents suffer from generational poverty. Besides, city development and 
modernization have always been national priorities, leaving rural areas extremely 
backward and poor. Although great efforts have been made to improve rural people’s life 
and to develop rural areas, when government realized that the gap between urban and 
rural has been getting increasingly huge, little progress has been made. These political 
attitudes and social contexts indicate that peasants should give way to the needs of 
development and modernization. They should do what they have been told and 
informed.  
Accountability structures also stands out as an important aspect of Chinese 
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policies and practices. As discussed earlier, the governance of projects in China is 
hierarchical. At each administrative level, regardless of whether a project is nationally 
funded or whether it involves international donors, the lowest level of the hierarchy is 
always held accountable to the next highest level of administration. In other words, they 
are accountable to the higher level of the administration. In the Three Gorges Dam 
resettlement case, those who are responsible for implementing the national resettlement 
policy and associated regulations view themselves as accountable to the next level of 
government rather than the affected population. Undoubtedly, this has profound 
influence on the outcomes of resettlement project.  
Achievements and major problems   
The resettlement project of Three Gorges Dam is a mega-project itself. By the 
time of writing, it has been going for almost twenty years and has involved a number of 
over 1.3 million population resettled. Although there has been criticism and controversies 
towards the approaches, policies and practices of resettlement, one has to admit that 
there are achievements as well. Unlike many developing countries, China has a well-
developed framework of legislation supporting dam-forced displacement and 
resettlement (Wilmsen, 2011). During the resettlement period, there has been no big 
social disturbance. Relocation work has been fairly smoothly implemented under the 
resettlement planning. The infrastructure for relocated cities and towns also has 
progressed (Wang, 2002). The mission of resettlement is also roughly achieved. 
However, these achievements can not overshadow the problems of resettlement 
program that have been broadly addressed.  
To begin with, the compensation issue in resettlement has always been highly 
controversial. Generally speaking, compensation lacks consistency across provinces 
and counties, which leads to injustice and anger among resettlers. Specifically, there are 
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mainly three problems in the compensation issue alone. First is the overall low level of 
compensation the government has provided to resettled people. As discussed before, 
the land is owned collectively in rural China. The compensation system reflected the 
land ownership system in China. Compensation was paid for the use value of land rather 
the value of land. Therefore, peasants do not receive compensation for the loss of land, 
because the land was not theirs in the first place. Local governments have substantial 
power in deciding the use value of the land and the value can be variable. Secondly, as 
abovementioned, the majority of resettled population have been rural residents. But a 
few of them are urban residents. Under the government's current resettlement policy, the 
rural people are to be compensated less than these urbanites. The disparity in 
compensation payments between rural and urban residents fueled great conflicts. 
Besides, within rural areas, there can be huge gaps with respect to compensation 
packages. Compensation was determined by county governments, who are entitled to 
assess the value of old houses and there’s no standard compensation that’s being used 
across all the affected communities, which led to the big gap between communities in 
terms of compensation. This reflects China’s political system. Since power is devolved 
from center to locality within China’s system of governance, county governments have a 
lot of autonomy with respect to compensation within their own jurisdictions when the 
policies and regulations come down from central government. As a result, different 
jurisdictions can have fairly different levels of compensation given the specific situations 
they face (Brook, et al, 2008; Wilmsen, 2011). This is a contributing factor that caused 
households to lose assets and become worse off post relocation.  
Lack of participation of affected people is another problem that has been 
frequently criticized among critics and media (World Bank, 2000). The Chinese 
government has been “accused” of using an inhumane approach of persuading people 
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to get out of their houses and move to somewhere they don’t know, mostly in a way of 
coercion and informing instead of consultation (Heggelund, 2004; Jing, 1999; Tan, 2008; 
etc.). Peasants don’t really have a say in the resettlement process regarding 
resettlement locations and livelihood options. Mostly, they are informed about what they 
have to do. Legally speaking, public participation is not the mandate of Chinese 
government since it’s not stipulated in the 2006 Regulations. Peasants are prevented 
from negotiating (Cao, Feng & Tao, 2008). This is also rooted back to China’s unique 
political atmosphere and historical legacy addressed above. China’s preference for 
urban and industrial forms of development over rural and agricultural forms of 
development indicate that peasants should give way to the needs of national priorities 
for development and modernization. The fundamental nature of this kind of program is 
that the few give rights away for the benefit of the many (Wilmsen, 2011). They should 
do what they have been told and informed. Besides, since peasants are historically not a 
well-educated group in China, their input was not taken seriously and it’s considered to 
be a waste of time to get them involved in an already demanding task. For example, at 
one village in Kaixian County, Chongqing Municipality, displacees were invited to 
‘participate in propaganda’ organized by the township resettlement office (Deng & 
Huang, 2004). At the meeting they were ‘lectured on the significance of the Three 
Gorges Project’, compensation standards, and the opportunities for livelihood 
development (Deng & Huang, 2004). This kind of consultation mainly takes the form of 
providing information. Another contributing factor that leads to poor implementation and 
outcomes of the resettlement policies is the accountability structures discussed earlier. 
One of the most common results of the earlier mentioned accountability structures is the 
asymmetrical relationships of power between the government officials and the affected 
population. In this case, what’s even worse is that the affected population are mostly 
vulnerable groups that usually acquire limited social resources. Vulnerable groups were 
 26 
not paid as much attention as they should have been paid. Since administrations 
responsible for implementing the resettlement policies and regulations are held 
accountable to the next level of government rather than the resettled people, local 
governments lack the incentive to consult the needs and demands of affected people.  
Other problems cited by scholars include: the underestimation of the number of 
relocated population; poor selection of designated resettlement in the early stage of 
resettlement that lead to “secondary resettlement”; lack of detailed planning of 
resettlement, including analysis of land availability and carrying capacity (Bryan, et al, 
2005; World Bank, 2000); corruption problems of local government (Ting, 1997; Wu, 
1998); insufficient attention to vulnerable groups, including women, ethnic minorities 
(Bryan, et al, 2005; World Bank, 2000); mismanagement of resettlement budget and 
time lag (Jing, 1999; World Bank, 2000); and the lack of a monitoring mechanism for the 
resettlement process2. Those problems are all micro-problems that resulted from the 
political characteristics of the Chinese government. “Micro” doesn’t mean they aren’t 
worth addressing, but rather those problems are of great significance that should be 
dealt with in order to improve the outcome of resettlement program. For example, the 
problem of corruption has caused public anger and is always worth our close attention. 
However, what I’m trying to address here is that those problems are of managerial 
nature and some of them are the result of the Chinese political system. In order to 
address the latter problems, radical reform should be made.  
Above all, China’s experience reflected the national objective during this time. 
The resettlement is a mirror that tells us the national priorities. Specifically, it indicated                                                         2 In 1995, the Communist Party officially introduced Xinfang, a creative complaint system 
compared to traditional formal legal institutions. It has served as a channel for citizens to 
seek assistance, to appeal government decisions, and to engage in a limited level of political participation (Minzner, 2009). 
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that during those periods the country has been focusing on economic growth in the 
context of the subordination of individuals to the collective and the few to the most; 
preference of urban-industrial development over rural development; disparities between 
urban and rural; the local implementation of national plans and directives; and the 
structure of land ownership, which have all shaped its story and made it unique. 
Dam-induced Resettlement in Canada 
History of Dam building and resettlement issue in Canada  
Similar to China, Canada also has an intensive history of dam construction. It is 
now the second largest hydroelectricity producer in the world. It is home to some of the 
largest and most powerful hydro power facilities in the world (International Water Power 
& Dam Construction, 2012). The dams are mainly used to for hydroelectric power 
generation, irrigation and flood control. The first large-scale dam building began during 
Second World War, when governments initiated a broad hydroelectric program 
(Evenden, 2009). Today there are approximately 450 hydroelectric power plants 
operating in Canada and more than 200 small hydro plants (<10 MW). Canada also has 
more than 800 dams that are used for hydroelectric power generation, irrigation and 
flood control (International Water Power & Dam Construction, 2012). However, quite 
different from China, the relocation issue in Canada has frequently involved First Nations 
mainly due to historical and environmental factors. Historically, the geographical 
displacement of aboriginal group resulted from the invasion of incoming Europeans 
since the 1600s and 1700s. Aboriginal people had to abandon their traditional hunting, 
fishing and residential lands. Their homelands were restricted through land purchase 
agreements, the treaty-making process and the establishment of reserves (Report of the 
Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, 1996). 
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In more recent times, the displacement of Aboriginal people has often taken the 
form of deliberate initiatives by governments to move particular Aboriginal communities 
for administrative or development purposes (Report of the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal People, 1996). Administrative resettlement means the resettlement of 
aboriginals for the purpose of government administration, usually to facilitate the 
operation of government in order to provide the growing number of social services and 
program or to reduce cost of administration.  
Aside from administrative resettlement, aboriginals have also made way for other 
national development policies, including hydroelectric projects. Resettlement induced by 
hydro dams began during Second World War, when demand for hydro electricity had 
largely increased. Those dams flooded aboriginal lands and fundamentally changed or 
destroyed the people’s economy in the affected area. The scale of resettlement in terms 
of affected population in Canada, however, can’t be remotely comparable to those in 
China. Normally, the number of resettled population in China for a single project would at 
least involve tens of thousands of people. However, as one of the least densely 
populated countries, in Canada, a number of around a thousand people would be 
considered to be a large-scale resettlement project. Thus, in Canada, it’s hard or even 
impossible to find a project that would relocate as many people as that in China. One 
has to admit that the scale of resettlement program does place some weight on the 
practices and outcomes of the resettlement program. But the point of this paper is not so 
much around the number of people affected in hydroelectric projects, but around the 
series of political practices and approaches of the resettlement process. For example, in 
1950s, Alcan’s Kemano hydroproject led to the relocation of approximately 200 people 
who had been living in the flooded area for centuries (Report of the Royal Commission 
on Aboriginal People, 1996). In Manitoba, the Churchill-Nelson project led to the 
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relocation of 450 persons and the Grand Rapids project displaced about 1250 people 
(Martin, 1998; Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1996). This resettlement has 
nevertheless been discussed and served as past experience for future practices. 
However, the small number of people affected doesn’t make the issue any less 
significant. 
Past practices concerning the resettlement of aboriginals were considered to lack 
consultation, although there were certain levels of negotiation before relocation plans 
were implemented. The decision making was dominated by the government. Abuses of 
authority and power are other problems that have been broadly criticized. Besides, 
coercion was also a characteristic in early population transfer activities. They were 
considered inhumane and were against the international human rights norms, especially 
those before 1978, when Canadian Human Rights Commission updated specific terms 
with respect to relocation (Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, 1996). 
Unsurprisingly, findings of impacts of past resettlement suggested that affected 
communities became less self-sufficient economically and their social fabric was 
severely destructed (Coffee 1992; Foley & Hamm, 1992; Martin & Hoffman, 2008; 
Wertman, 1983). Before resettlement, aboriginals seldom needed financial assistance 
from the government. However, after resettlement most of them need assistance from 
government, which caused them to live on welfare. The overall impacts of resettlement 
on aboriginals include declining health, reduced economic opportunities, increased 
dependence on government and cultural disintegration (Report of the Royal Commission 
on Aboriginal People, 1996). 
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A Case study of Hydroelectric Projects-induced Resettlement among James Bay 
Cree  
Introduction of James Bay Hydroelectric projects and Cree Bands  
In 1972, the Province of Quebec and Hydro Quebec first announced their 
intention to initiate the James Bay Hydroelectric development project (Wertman, 1983). 
Since then, the indigenous people of the area, the James Bay Cree and the northern 
Quebec Inuit, began an involvement in a complex negotiating process. The James Bay 
hydro project is large and multi-faceted. Located in northern Quebec about 1,000 km 
north of Montreal, the southern end of Hudson Bay in eastern Canada, bordering the 
provinces of Quebec and Ontario, the first part of the hydro development (called La 
Grande Complex, Phase I) consists of five large and shallow reservoirs (LG2, LG3, LG4, 
Opinaca, Caniapiscau) and three power generating stations (Ma, Hipel, & De, 2005). 
Two of the reservoirs serve the purpose of diverting waters from two additional 
watersheds into the La Grande River. In 1985, Phase I of the project was completed. 
The first phase of the La Grande project resulted in three power stations being 
constructed that are capable of generating 10 282 MW of power at a cost of CAN$13.8 
billion (Coffee, 1992; Foley & Hamm, 1992). Phase II of La Grande Complex, which 
serves to tap some of the remaining potential along the La Grande, has been under 
construction since about 1987 by Hydro- Québec. In total, eight generating stations were 
constructed in the two phases which produced more than half of Québec's hydroelectric 
power. The plan also included the construction of five more power plants with an 
installed capacity of 3516 MW (Ma, et al, 2005). The entire James Bay project includes 
the La Grande project (James Bay I), the Great Whale project (James Bay II) and the 
NBR project (project on the Nottaway, Broadback, and Rupert rivers). For the Québec 
government, constructing such massive scale of hydroelectric project is economic-
driven. Specifically, the hydroelectric project would create tens of thousands of jobs and 
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create a new trade base for Québec in having surplus power for export. However, more 
and more groups and individuals are against further development in this area due to its 
adverse environmental impacts and devastating destruction to the Cree communities it 
would bring. And the massive government-sponsored hydroelectric development led to 
great and intense conflict between the Cree Bands (Cree and Inuit Indian tribes) and 
Canadian Government, Hydro-Qubec and other NGO groups, which will be discussed in 
detail later in this section.  
The James Bay Cree region lies to the east and southeast of James Bay. [The 
Eastern] Cree have lived there since the glaciers left about 9,000 years ago (Foggin & 
Foggin, 2008). It is the home to Cree and Inuit. At the time of announcing the initiative of 
constructing number of dams and power stations, there were eight different communities 
within the James Bay Crees, who have lived on their lands and formed their unique way 
of living for generations. The construction of the massive hydroelectric project was likely 
to flood as much as 8800 square kilometers of land, which was a part of the territory 
upon which they engaged in their traditional pursuits of hunting, fishing, and trapping-in 
short, their subsistence base (Wertman, 1983). The projects have or will cause either 
flooding or serious erosion of the land on which several communities are situated 
requiring the relocation of these communities. Since the Crees and Inuit are dependent 
on fish for living and employment, the exploiting of their communities would bring radical 
negative impact on their traditional way of life. Consequently, the controversies around 
the construction of series of hydroelectric projects include the effect on the Aboriginal 
population and the environment. This paper will specifically focus on the effect on the 
Aboriginal population with respect to the resettlement issue. 
Resettlement Program  
The resettlement issue of James Bay Crees induced by the construction of 
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massive hydroelectric projects is one of the issues among all of the negotiation issues 
between James Bay Crees and the Canadian government over the last three decades 
when the construction of hydro dams took place. The James Bay Cree have been 
struggling to cope with major dislocations of their traditional hunting and trapping areas 
over the past 30 years (Foggin & Foggin, 2008). The number of Aboriginals affected is 
estimated to be a few thousands of people. But there’s no exact figure as to the exact 
number of people being resettled. Among all the relocation programs, the most typical 
one is the Fort George Relocation (Cree Nation of Chisasibi, 2006). It is one of the 
village, called Fort George, with a population of 2373, at the mouth of La Grande Rivière 
was uprooted and relocated upstream during the first phase of construction, with over 
200 houses being physically moved. Since the purpose of this paper is to compare the 
practices and approaches that China and Canada each pursue with respect to similar 
issues from a political lens and there’s no exact number of affected population recorded 
to my best knowledge (even if they do, as aforementioned, the scale of affected 
population in Canada can’t be comparable to those in China), thus, the main emphasis 
will be around how they reached the resettlement decision and how this issue was dealt 
with on the Canadian part of this paper. 
Political Principles, Standards and Approaches of Resettlement  
In Canada, issues relating to Aboriginals are usually handled by signing treaties 
and agreements between Aboriginal communities and the provincial and federal 
governments after negotiation. Concerning involuntary resettlement issues, through 
agreement, aboriginal people gained monetary compensation as well as land, although 
some groups gained more money and land than others. Usually those parties sign 
agreements that list all the aspects and provisions such as: compensation packages, 
mechanism for internalization of the socio-economic and environmental costs associated 
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with large-scale projects, comprehensive community planning and etc. of the planned 
hydroelectric projects (Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, 1996). 
Therefore, the resettlement issue in Canada is closely related to the negotiation process 
and outcomes between the Crees and the federal and provincial government. The 
resettlement program is more of a result from the debate and negotiation between Crees 
and the Canadian government. Consequently, the outcomes of negotiations result partly 
from the negotiation skills the involved parties possess. Obviously, the approach of 
handling this issue is quite different from those in China. During the construction of 
hydroelectric projects in James Bay, the Fort George Relocation Corporation was 
formed to handle the relocation and the construction of the present town site through 
negotiations between the Crees and the Quebec Government over the James Bay 
Power Project (Cree Nation of Chisasibi, 2006). Early in the negotiations the Cree 
formed their own political association, the Grand Council of the Cree (of Quebec) 
(GCCQ), with the chief and another leader from each community on its Board of 
Directors, and an executive group of four regional leaders. The Grand Council took over 
organization of the negotiations. However, the Cree people remained the final decision-
makers as to whether to accept the results of the negotiation (Feit, 1995). One of the 
most significant agreements that has been signed between the Crees and Canadian 
government during this period is doubtless the James Bay and Northern Quebec 
Agreement (JBNQA). This agreement was signed on November 11, 1975 by the Cree 
and Inuit peoples of Quebec, the James Bay Development Corporation, the James Bay 
Energy Corporation and Hydro Quebec (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 
Canada, 2002). JBNQA was the first comprehensive land claim agreement signed in 
modern times by Canada and Aboriginal people. In terms of compensation, the Cree and 
the Inuit received a total amount of $225 million under the JBNQA (Aboriginal Affairs and 
Northern Development Canada, 2002).  
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Furthermore, according to the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
People (1996), the principles and criteria to relocate in Canada include: 
1. the requirement for government to obtain appropriate authority before 
proceeding with relocation; 
2. the need for the relocatees to give their informed consent to the relocation;  
3. the care and skill with which the relocation is planned, carried out and 
supervised;  
4. the promises made and whether they are kept; and  
5. the humaneness of the relocation. 
Those principles reflect respect and democracy towards the relocatees rather than 
strong political flavor in an effort to reduce the arbitrary exercise of power by 
governments. At the same time, Canada has made great efforts to match the 
international standards for involuntary resettlement based on human rights of all 
persons. The minimum standards, which are consistent with the criteria aforementioned, 
for involuntary resettlement are (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 
2012):  
1. Governments must obtain and follow appropriate authority before proceeding 
with relocation. 
2. The people who are to be moved must give their free and informed consent to 
the move and should be participants in decision making concerning the relocation. 
3. The relocation must be well planned and implemented and should include 
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consultation and planning with the host community. 
4. Promises made concerning the relocation should be kept and supported by 
adequate resources. In this regard, compensation should be adequate and persons 
relocated should have ample opportunity to maintain or improve their standard of living 
in the new location. 
5. The relocation must be carried out in a humane manner, respecting the rights 
of persons in keeping with Canada's international commitments and obligations. In this 
regard, persons who are to be relocated should have the opportunity to settle as a group 
in one receiving community. 
6. Government actions must conform with the government's fiduciary obligations 
to Aboriginal peoples. 
Political Factors that influence the Resettlement Process  
As one of the issues aboriginals fight against the Canadian Government in the 
construction of hydroelectric project, Canada’s resettlement process has its special 
characteristics due to its unique political system and historical legacy. In order to make it 
more comparable so that China can learn some experience from Canada’s side, the 
political factors concluded here mainly include the central-local governmental 
relationship, the land ownership system and the autonomy of Aboriginals.  
First of all, in Canada, the scope of different levels of government responsible for 
different issues is very clear. The issues of Aboriginals fall under the jurisdiction of 
federal government. Some element of local government may also be involved but is only 
limited to provide local services after the agreement is reached between Aboriginals and 
the government. Therefore, to deal with involuntary resettlement of Aboriginals is 
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actually about the relationship between Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals.  
Second, the land, in other words, the property, is usually privately owned in 
Canada.  However, when it comes to Aboriginal reserves, the land ownership is actually 
quite similar to that in China because the land is owned by the community as a whole. 
However, this kind of ownership is the reason that when the government expropriates 
the land from the Crees, the compensation is extremely large, compared to those in 
developing countries because compensation usually covers a wide range of social 
services as well as the compensation for land loss. They also have the option to 
negotiate the unsettled land rights with the government of Canada. By the time the 
James Bay Hydroelectric project was proposed, the Government of Quebec retained the 
ownership of the land and had the right to reclaim any part of it. The Government of 
Quebec could develop it with the permission of the federal government (Richardson, 
1976). As the continuous fighting against the development projects on their lands went 
on, Crees gradually made progress and Canada first established policies on Aboriginal 
claims in 1973, along with processes and funding for resolving these claims through 
negotiation. It is important to note that these are optional processes that provide 
Aboriginal groups with an alternative to going to court to resolve their claims (Aboriginal 
Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 2012). 
Thirdly, a high level of autonomy was seen during the fighting with Canadian 
government in an attempt to resist undesirable development within their communities. 
The negotiation process is considered a history of fighting for the level of self-
governance. Aboriginals have the right or choice to go to a court to fight against the 
notion of development within their communities. In the fall of 1972, the native people 
(Quebec Association of Indians) applied to the Quebec Superior Court for an injunction 
to stop all construction in the James. A series of negotiations went on since. Those 
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negotiations minimize the resettlement scale in some sense.  
Achievements and major problems   
The relocation in James Bay Hydroelectric project is usually considered to be a 
well organized one that set a good example for other countries in this matter. However, 
two major problems need to be addressed here. The first is the imbalance of power 
between relocatees and the Canadian government. During the construction of the 
hydroelectric projects, officials of federal and provincial governments, often proceeding 
in collaboration with non-governmental interests such as the Hudson's Bay Company, 
decided that people should move and pressured them to do so, especially in the early 
stage. Mostly governments and developers see themselves as having interests contrary 
to those of the Aboriginal peoples. The tension between Crees and the governments 
cannot be mitigated as long as the context of power imbalances, hostility and contention 
doesn’t change. 
Another controversy is the cultural dimension. Although the Cree Indians agreed 
to a multimillion-dollar compensation settlement, some people inside and outside the 
Indian community claim that the agreement led to a loss of the Indian cultural identity. 
People’s bonds with each other and their lives in general have been affected such that 
they have been forced to change their way of living that they have been leading for 
generations. In the name of civilization, modernization and development, Aboriginals 
were assimilated by explorers from Europe. The community and social ties loosened. 
And they found it hard to keep their traditions, values and culture ever since the dam 
was built in their territory. The younger generation no longer has as strong emotional 
attachment to their lands as their grandparents do. They don’t know the language well. 
They have not acquired good trapping skills. They gradually lost their identity. Their 
traditional ways of life were compromised or forever removed as seen by aboriginals 
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(Martin & Hoffman, 2008; Waldram, 1987). The relocation of Aboriginal people is as an 
on-going, necessary, and functional step in the continuing process of colonialism that 
had begun over a century ago.  The Van Ginkel Association report asserted that “the 
ultimate solution for every Indian in North America will be to become a member of our 
technocratic society and whether this society is perfect or not is irrelevant. There is 
simply no choice but to take part in that society, if the individual is to achieve full status.”  
As for those displaced by James Bay project (Gutman, 1994), they either ended up 
acknowledging the economic and social benefits stemming from a closer integration into 
national societies or living on government welfare. 
The implementation of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement was 
also criticized. Many provisions in the agreement are vague, ambiguous and open to 
differing interpretations. Besides, the Crees and Inuit both claimed that after the 
Agreement was signed, governments began to eliminate or reduce services that they 
were entitled to in housing, infrastructure, health and education (Richardson, 1976). The 
economic development in the communities was also considered to be a failure although 
the objective of the Agreement was to develop these areas. 
However, from the standpoint of resettlement practices and approaches, the 
achievements outweigh the drawbacks in the experience of James Bay Hydroelectric 
project. The most significant achievement is the establishment of the James Bay and 
Northern Quebec Agreement, which covers lands claims, environmental and social 
protection, economic development, education, hunting, fishing and trapping. The Cree 
did benefit from this Agreement. It serves as an important framework for the Canadian 
government to deal with issues related to the Natives and for other countries dealing 
with similar issues. The negotiation of the resettlement process resulted in a political 
socialization and empowerment which will enable the relocated people to defend their 
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interests more capably in the future. It sets a good example for other countries in 
addressing this issue. 
Conclusion  
As one of the main reasons that caused population transfers, hydroelectric 
projects-induced resettlement have always drawn the attention of academics. Like other 
development resettlements, hydro dams were considered to serve the public interest in 
exchange for sacrificing the rights and interests of certain groups of people to make way 
for infrastructure construction under the name of development, modernization and 
industrialization. Large dams, such as the Three Georges Dam in China and the James 
Bay Hydroelectric projects are both such examples. The impact of those dam-induced 
resettlement can be profound and long-lasting, usually criticized by anthropologists and 
environmentalists. Most of the controversies are around the inhuman element, the 
adverse social and environmental impact, economic loss and psychological stress to 
relocatees. This paper examines two different cases in China and Canada and attempts 
to compare the approaches and practices in two different systems and explore what 
China can learn from Canada.  
Although China and Canada have totally different legal systems, political systems 
and cultural legacies, we still found some similarities with respect to involuntary 
resettlement.  
Both the peasants and Aboriginals uprooted by the construction of dams are 
land-based groups who rely heavily on their land as a way of living. Their ties to their 
lands are tight both in economic and emotional terms. The issues relating peasants and 
Aboriginals in each country are long and ingrained problems for each country. For a long 
time, they were both considered to be poor and incapable of making their own decisions. 
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Thus, each group has been marginalized in the process. Both groups had suffered from 
economic loss and were worse off after resettlement. The Cree Nation, one of the First 
Nations, wanted to escape the cycle of dependency and poverty just like their 
counterparts in China do. 
The organized resettlement practices in both countries are relatively short, 
although the history of dam construction is relatively long. In China, its comprehensive 
resettlement practice started in the 1990s. In Canada, the history of Aboriginal 
resettlement has also been severely criticized by academics (Hoffman & Martin, 2008; 
Richardson, 1976). Richardson (1976) claimed that “strangers” devour the Aboriginal 
land with the purpose of economic development in the affected areas. The Cree culture 
has been destroyed because “white people” weren’t showing respect to their culture. 
Prior to the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, Aboriginal reserves had been 
constantly invaded by outsiders because the government had only focused on capital-
intensive, resource-extractive industries as a way of development.  
Clearly, the general democratic or authoritarian character of the state would set a 
'climate' for such a controversial issue. The differences between the two countries are 
worth more attention. Firstly, although both groups are tied to their lands, issues of 
cultural identity are more connected to the land for the Aboriginals of northern Quebec 
than for the peasants of the Three Gorges Dam in China. Thus the historical and cultural 
legacy has been given more attention in Canada. When I get further into the literature 
around issues of relationship between First Nations and Canadian government, I 
somehow found that their problem is even tougher than the issue of China’s peasants. 
The identity as being Aboriginals and their “society” in Canada certainly has a larger 
impact on their lives especially when they have even tighter ties to their communities 
and less connections to the “outside” world.  They are truly those who have lived where 
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they live generation after generation. Peasants in remote and backward regions of 
China, however, have always been referred to as one of the “inferior groups”. They have 
less social resources that they can take advantage of in order to protect their own 
interest. They are normally less educated. What separates them from aboriginals is that 
they fight to change their social and economic status.  Nobody wants to be poor and 
belittled peasants who suffer from generational poverty. Another point is the conflict of 
interest between pro-development party and the against-development party. In China, 
the interests of peasants are compromised for the sake of development. In Canada, the 
governments and developers also tried to persuade Aboriginals to exploit their reserves. 
More often than not, the conflicts occur between Aboriginals and the governments and 
developers. 
Another significant difference is that Aboriginals absolutely have more power and 
rights in Canada than peasants do in China. In China, the government tells the peasants 
what to do, although they claim peasants will benefit from their actions and it’s for their 
good to do what they have been told to do. Whereas in Canada, Aboriginals can use 
legal tools to fight against the undesirable developments sponsored by Canadian 
government. They can negotiate or just go to court in an attempt to halt the development 
projects. In the James Bay Hydroelectric project, the Cree people called for federal 
intervention to stop Hydro-Quebec from exploiting their lands (Richardson, 1976). One 
way or the other, they acquire more power and rights to protect their interests. More 
often than not, they did succeed to some extent to protect their own communities. 
What’s more, aboriginals have their own group that represents their interests in 
negotiating with the federal government, which is more experienced and sophisticated at 
the negotiation table. The form of negotiation is no doubt more just and fair. Through 
negotiations, both parties can reach agreement on specific terms, such as compensation 
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package, future development, etc. Negotiations can be considered as a form of 
participation in the decision making process of such issues and a way of expressing its 
needs and wants. Whereas in China, no such thing exists. The only participation they 
have been involved in the resettlement process is some meetings held by local 
government informing them the benefits they would gain from the project.  
Both countries have taken totally different approaches in addressing this problem.  
In Canada, groups can file claim in courts if they oppose the proposal of dam 
construction on their lands. And they have their own organization, such as Grand 
Council of the Cree to fight against the government. In China, people don’t really have 
such choice until the “Xinfang”, a complaint system, was being used to monitor the 
practices of government mentioned earlier. As addressed earlier, economic development 
and modernization are the priorities of the state. Some people have to make way for 
those development projects for public good. Above all, for Chinese peasants, it’s almost 
impossible to pursue such an approach to protect their own interests. They don’t have 
an group to represent their interests and negotiate with government. They have to 
accept what would come to them. They are less vocal. They mostly fight individually. 
They are on their own. And they are powerless. 
The land ownership system also plays a role to the outcomes of the 
compensation package. In China, land is collectively owned in rural areas and peasants 
only have the right to use the land not own it. In Canada, Aboriginal lands are also 
owned by the communities instead of owned by individual people. However, most 
Chinese peasants ended up receiving thousands of dollars while the Crees received 
tens of millions dollars as a result of resettlement.  A major reason is because the 
compensation that Crees received is a whole package that covers not only the 
compensation for the loss of land, but also the overall development of the area, such as 
education, economic development, etc. 
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The authority of government in China is less questioned than that in Canada. The 
approval of dam construction and resettlement decision takes much longer time than it 
does in China. Besides, the sources of funding are also different. In China, the main 
funding source for dams is from the central government; while in Canada, there are 
several sources for dam construction, including federal, provincial, in early days, local 
government all grant money for damming.  
The central-local governmental relationship also plays a role. In Canada, the 
relationship tends to be less hierarchical. In China, as discussed earlier, government is 
hierarchical but the power is devolved. Regulations come down from the central 
government and local governments are responsible for the implementation. This may 
lead to the loose implementation and great autonomy of local government, which is one 
of reasons of corruption and lack of accountability. However, in Canada, there is a much 
more clear boundary as to what issues fall under the jurisdiction of federal/ provincial 
government or local government. This makes a big difference in the accountability 
structure and the outcomes of implementation. Clear accountability structures facilitate 
the responsible and strict implementation of regulations and agreements. 
From Canada’s experience, we can learn that the balance of power and the 
allocation of social and economic resources are important for a just society and in any 
issues that involve conflicts of interest. The Chinese government, especially the central 
government, should learn to empower its citizens rather than control them and centralize 
resources and power, especially if it wants to build a harmonious society. Transparency 
and accountability and efficiency quality of service delivery can never be stressed 
enough in governmental practice. Defining priorities of the served communities is also 
crucial. Citizen participation and efficient mechanisms for communication, instead of just 
providing information, should be required for the Chinese government. The peasants, on 
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the hand, should learn to acquire some kind of political skills which will enable them to 
represent their own interests themselves in the future.  
Involuntary resettlement remains a tough issue for human being. But some 
suggestions that help make the process less inhumane and more justifiable include 
equality, adequate compensation, respect, and implementation of the terms of the 
agreement. No matter what measures or approaches have been taken or will be taken, 
the goal should be to assist peasants and first nations for a more just and promising 
future. Both the outcomes should reflect some aspect of protecting and respecting 
human rights, their traditions and the land where they used to live as well as to improve 
their quality of life and build harmonious relationship among the different parties. One 
ideal situation is to maintain their traditions as much as possible and develop new 
approaches for development, although it seems impossible to both maintain their old 
ways of living and develop those projects that would be beneficial for the society 
economically. But one thing for sure is that, if neither side is to compromise, the less 
powerful side is going to lose and the whole society is also going to pay for it. 
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